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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of introducing price stabilizing mechanisms (PSMs) in
carbon markets to prevent emission prices to fall too low in case of exogenous macroeconomic downturns.
“By capping overall greenhouse gas emissions from major sectors of the economy, the EU ETS creates
an incentive for companies to invest in technologies that cut emissions. The market price of allowances
- the ‘carbon price’ - creates a greater incentive the higher it is” (European Commission, 2013).
This sentence testifies the widespread consensus that, overall, higher prices on emissions
provide stronger incentives to invest in lower emission technologies. Such belief is one of
the reasons that recently pushed the European Commission to introduce a market stability
reserve (MSR), a measure aimed at reabsorbing excessive surplus of allowances in the EU
ETS market and avoid their prices reaching too low levels.1
We analyse with a stylised model the theoretical foundation of this belief and discuss why
this generally valid principle is subject to some exceptions. Based on the intuitions suggested by our framework, we then analyse few potential unintended effects of some forms
of price stabilizing mechanisms (PSM) for emissions.
In order to understand how high carbon prices can stimulate investments in cleaner technologies, we consider a PSM that adjusts ex-post the emission cap to counterbalance negative shocks of aggregate demand. Let Dd and Dc be the aggregate demands of carbon emissions under two different types of abatement technology, namely a less efficient, or “dirty”,
technology, and a more efficient and “clean” one. Figure 1 depicts a situation in which the
more efficient the abatement technology, the lower the cost of abating, the lower the demand
of emissions. Cap0 represents an initial emission cap, i.e. the total number of emission permits, defining the maximum level of pollution e0 that firms can emit in the aggregate. The
relative scarcity of permits with respect to the demand for emissions generates a price τ0 , if
firms use the dirty technology, or τ1 , if they adopt the clean one.
In the absence of price stabilizing instruments, any change on the demand side is accommodated by a variation in emissions price that does not affect the total amount of pollution.
The areas below the demand curves on the left of emax represent the “benefits” of pollution
that firms lose when they must emit less than emax . Therefore, the gain from switching to
the clean technology when the cap is set at Cap0 is represented by the area between Dd and
Dc , measured in the interval between e0 and emax (area a), where emax represents the level of
emissions that firms would choose in the absence of regulation.
Suppose now that an exogenous macroeconomic shock reduces the aggregate demand for
1 Decision

2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
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Figure 1:
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carbon emission from Dc to Dc0 and from Dd to Dd0 (depicted in red in Figure 1). This situation
could happen, for instance, in times of recession, when a decrease in total consumption
or other sources of market uncertainty induce a slowdown of industrial output. In this
new scenario, the gain from switching to the clean technology is represented by b, which is
strictly smaller than a. Hence, not surprisingly, a reduction in aggregate demand reduces
the incentives to invest in emission-reducing technologies. However, if the regulator reacts
reducing the aggregate cap from Cap0 to Cap1 , it can “replicate” the pre-shock situation,
since the firms’ gain from switching to a cleaner technologies is given by the area (c + b) = a.
In other words, by adjusting the cap, the regulator can modulate the incentives to invest by
adjusting the market to the macroeconomic conditions.
Such analysis is simple and intuitive, but can lead to imprecise conclusions since it focuses
only on the benefits of switching from the dirty to the clean technology, abstracting from the
related investment costs and, ultimately, the firms’ profits. We enrich the analysis above by
describing the mechanisms through which automatic PSMs based on cap adjustments may
bring about unintended effects.
In particular, we construct a simple theoretical model to investigate how PSMs might affect
investments in abatement technologies during economic downturns. We argue that reducing the aggregate cap on permits during recession periods could discourage new investments in low emission technologies by weakening the financial status of the firms. Indeed,
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when unfavorable macroeconomic conditions reduce emissions because of weak demand,
adjusting the emission permits supply to sustain the carbon price is a pro-cyclical measure
which brings about higher compliance costs and further reductions of profits, unless the
regulator can compensate firms by buying back their allowances.
Moreover, the impact of the PSM depends on the type of abatement technology considered.2 In case of integrated abatement technologies, we argue that, even when an emission
reducing investment is profitable, the required high carbon prices can lead to an increase of
emissions. Interestingly, this circumstance is more likely to occur during recession periods
if emissions prices are prevented from decreasing in response to lower demand.
The great attention to the effects of introducing stabilizing measures in carbon markets is
testified by the extensive literature studying the EU ETS ( Landis, 2015; Richstein et al., 2015;
Schopp et al., 2015; Fell, 2016, Hepburn et al.,2016, Holt and Shobe, 2016; Kollenberg and
Taschini, 2016; Perino and Willner, 2016 and Salant, 2016). Other papers deal with hybrid
emissions trading systems characterized by bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement
as measures to improve the governance of carbon markets (Grull and Taschini, 2011; Wood
and Jotzo, 2011; Clò et al., 2013; de Perthuis and Trotignon, 2014; Hu et al., 2015 and Abrell
and Rausch, 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in this
strand of literature dealing with the interaction of PSMs in emission markets and exogenous
macroeconomic downturns on firms’ decisions about investments and emissions.
Other related papers are Earnhart and Segerson (2012) - who study the influence of firms’
financial status on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement - Ghisetti et al. (2017) who assess the role of financial barriers behind firms’ adoption of environmental innovations - and Dardati and Riutort (2016) - who study how financial constraints affect investment behavior within a cap-and-trade system, showing empirically that investments are
positively related to the market value of the permit holdings. Finally, we also contribute to
the economic literature on optimal environmental policy and business cycle, whose results
suggest to relax the cap on emissions during economic expansions and tightening it during
recessions (Heutel (2012) and Doda (2016)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we derive a simple model
that allows to analyze the effects of PSMs on the decision to invest in cleaner end-of-pipe
technologies. Section 3 shows how PSMs can bring about more emissions when firms invest
in integrated abatement technologies, while Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
The derivation of the main results is available in a final Appendix.
2 The literature typically distinguishes end of pipe abatement technologies - which filter out the emissions
generated through the production process - and integrated technologies - which generate less emissions through
a more efficient processing.
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2 Investments in cleaner technologies during macroeconomic
downturns
Let π ( x ) = px − c( x ) − α1 (s − e)2 be the profit of the representative firm operating in the
market of good x. The demand for x is given by the exogenous price p.3 c( x ) =

1 2
2x

+F

represents the production cost, where F ≥ 0 is a fixed cost. Let s be the level of carbon gross
emissions generated by the production of x, and e ∈ [0, s] the level of final emissions allowed
to the firm. The parameter α > 0 describes an end-of-pipe abatement technology affecting
the cost of cleaning gross emissions. Hence, α1 (s − e)2 represents the cost of reducing carbon
emissions from s to e.
Assume that s = x. Then, the optimal production level is x (e) =

αp+2e
α +2

and, substituting

back into π ( x ), we can write the optimal profit as a function of the regulated emission level
e, that is:
π (e) =

p2 α
4p
2
+
e−
e2 − F.
2( α + 2) 2( α + 2)
2( α + 2)

This is increasing in e whenever e < emax , where emax = p is the optimal level of emissions
when the firm’s emissions are not restricted by any form of regulation (i. e. when e = s).
The derivative of π (e) represents the firm’s marginal emissions benefit, MEB =

2p
α +2

− α+2 2 e,

which is a downward sloping linear function of e, with MEB equal to zero when e = emax
and MEB equal to

2p
α +2

when e = 0.

Note also that:
1. ∂MEB
∂p > 0 for any level of e
∂MEB
∂α

< 0 when e < emax
The MEB curve represents the firm’s willingness to pay for a marginal increase of emis2.

sions, in the like of the demand for emissions depicted in Figure 1.4 We use p, that is the
inverse demand function of x, as a proxy for the macroeconomic conditions and interpret
the first comparative statics result above as a confirmation of the intuition that emissions
demand behaves pro-cyclically (Doda, 2014). In other words, the MEB increases when the
demand of x increases.
Moreover, an increase in α, i.e. an investment that reduces the cost of end-of-pipe abatement, brings about a counter-clockwise movement of the MEB curve around its intercept on
the horizontal axis, emax . This is precisely the conventionally assumed effect of a technological innovation as the one depicted in Figure 1 and discussed in the Introduction.
3 This

is made for the sake of simplicity as our analysis would not change qualitatively if we used a more
∂p( x )
general inverse demand function p( x ) with ∂x ≤ 0.
4 The demand for emissions as function of the carbon price τ can be written as e ( τ ) = p − τ α+2 (see the
2
Appendix).
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When the firm has to decide whether to invest in a technology that increases α, it compares
the cost and the benefit of such investment. The marginal effect of an increase of α on the
emission benefit is:

∂π (e)
( p − e )2
=
,
∂α
( α + 2)2

which is always positive. Therefore, emission benefits are increasing in α and the firm invests in α as long as

∂π (e)
∂α

is larger than the marginal cost of the investment in α.

Note that, in the relevant range 0 < e < emax ,

∂2 π ( e )
∂α∂p

> 0 and

∂2 π ( e )
∂α∂e

< 0. The first inequality

suggests that the marginal benefits of investing in α can be lowered by a macroeconomic
downturn that reduces p. The second inequality implies that a more stringent cap on carbon permits always increases the marginal benefit of investing in end-of-pipe technologies.
Therefore, a reduction of e can counterbalance the negative effect induced by a contraction
of p and a PSM can actually increase the benefit related to an investment in end-of-pipe
technologies during a macroeconomic downturn. However, this does not imply that the
firm would actually invest. In fact, despite the possible positive effect that a tighter cap has
on the investment benefits, a reduction of e increases abatement costs and, consequently,
reduces profits. This can be a serious issue during macroeconomic downturns and in the
presence of fixed costs. Such concern is summarized by the following claim:
Claim 1 During macroeconomic downturns a PSM can have pro-cyclical effects and hamper investments in cleaner technologies.
To illustrate this claim, we provide a numerical example. We consider a discrete investment
in an end-of-pipe technology that increases α from α0 = 1 to α1 = 2. Let Φ represent
the fixed cost of such investment. We compare the investment contingent profits under
three scenarios. The first represents a situation characterized by a high emissions demand
(p = 100) and a high emissions cap (e = 70). The second scenario considers the case where
the demand is lowered by a recession (p = 80) while the cap is unchanged (e = 70). Finally,
in the third scenario, the emission cap is adjusted to the lower demand of permits in order
to guarantee the same emission price of the first scenario. This requires p = 80 and e = 50
(see Figure 2). Table 2 summarizes the profits values under the three alternative scenarios,
for both α0 and α1 .
Table 1
Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

p = 100 and e = 70

p = 80 and e = 70

p = 80 and e = 50

α0 = 1

π = 4700 − F

π = 3166.6̄ − F

π = 2900 − F

α1 = 2

π = 4775 − F

π = 3175 − F

π = 2975 − F
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In the first scenario, the investment benefit, that is the difference between π = 4775 − F
and π = 4700 − F, is 75 and corresponds to the area labeled as a in Figure 2, i.e. the area
between MEB(e, α0 , p = 100) and MEB(e, α1 , p = 100) in the interval 70 < e < 100. Note
that in this scenario the carbon price is 20 under α0 and 15 under α1 .
In the second scenario, characterized by a macroeconomic downturn and an unchanged
supply of carbon permits, carbon prices are significantly lower, namely 6.6̄ under α0 and 5
under α1 . Moreover we observe a reduction of the benefit of investing in the end-of-pipe
technology which is now equal to 8.3̄, that is the difference between the profit under α0 ,
π = 3166.6̄ − F, and the profit under α1 , π = 3175 − F. Such benefit corresponds to the
area between MEB(e, α0 , p = 80) and MEB(e, α1 , p = 80) in the interval 70 < e < 80. As
a consequence, if 8.3̄ < Φ < 75, the net investment benefit is positive under p = 100, but
becomes negative when the decrease of demand brings about a reduction of the output price
to p = 80.
The environmental regulator can restore the initial investment benefit by reducing e in response to a reduction of p. When p = 80 the cap on carbon permits that allows to pursue
such objective is e = 50. Indeed, when e = 50 and p = 80, the carbon equilibrium prices are
as in the first scenario, that is 20 under α0 and 15 under α1 . Moreover, the original investment benefit is restored since it is now equal to (2975 − F ) − (2900 − F ) = 75, corresponding
to the area between MEB(e, α0 , p = 80) and MEB(e, α1 , p = 80) in the interval 50 < e < 80
(the sum of b and c in Figure 2).
However, restoring the original investment benefit comes at the cost of lower profits: for
both α0 and α1 profits are higher under Scenario 2 than under Scenario 3. This is, of course,
a reason for concern whenever the relatively heavier burden of the fixed costs makes the
investment not viable. When this happens, firms can either resort to un-authorised emissions (if the expected cost of being caught is low) or exit the market. For instance, if p = 80,
2975 < F < 3166.6̄ and Φ < 8.334, the firm would find it profitable to invest when e = 70
while negative profits could prevent investments if e = 50. Lower profits are the consequence of higher compliance costs due to a lower emissions cap. In Figure 2, such additional
costs are identified by the areas d and c + d which are equal to 200 and 266, 6, respectively,
that is the difference between the profits under Scenarios 2 and 3, evaluated for the cases of
α = 2 α = 1.
In a more realistic scenario with heterogeneous firms and capacity constraints, we can expect a compounding effect for which, if the joint effect of a recession and a more stringent
emissions cap push some firms out of business, the demand of permits decreases further,
causing a new reduction of emissions price that, in turn, could induce the regulator to react by adopting an even tighter cap. Of course, the relevance of such issue depends on the
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Figure 2:
e
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firms financial conditions and other factors as, for instance, the availability of credit. In fact,
firms could still invest and cover their temporary losses by either using their own assets or
accessing financial markets. However, since these options might be severely restrained during recessions, tightening the cap can become a strongly pro-cyclical policy that can hamper
investments in cleaner technologies.
It is worth noting that alternative policy options have been proposed to stabilize carbon
prices (see, for instance, Grull and Taschini, 2011; Wood and Jotzo, 2011 and Clo et al.,
2013). For instance, the regulator can commit to buy back any quantity of permits at a
predetermined price, giving to the representative firm the possibility of choosing the level
of e which is optimal for that price. Such price floor regime does not penalize investments
in cleaner technologies during macroeconomic downturns. In fact, the regulator could buy
back any permit at τ = 20 if α0 = 1, or at τ = 15 if α1 = 2. If p goes from 100 to 80
when such price floor is in place, the emissions demands shift down to MEB(e, α0 , p = 80)
and MEB(e, α1 , p = 80), and the representative firm would find optimal to sell 20 units of
e and emit e = 50 as in Scenario 3. Notice that the burden of such reduction is transferred
to the regulator (i.e. to the society) who pays the firm 400, under α = 1, and 300, under
α = 2, so that firm’s profits are now greater than those arising under Scenario 2 and equal to
π = 3300 − F and π = 3375 − F, respectively. The analysis of the distributional effects due
to the implementation of different PSMs is an interesting issue that deserve further investigation, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
8
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In the following section, we discuss how preventing emission price to go below a certain
level could imply another unintended outcome when firms invest in integrated abatement
technologies.

3 Integrated abatement technologies, environmental quality
and macroeconomic downturns
Assume that s =

1
ωx

is the level of carbon gross emissions generated by the production of

x, where ω ≥ 1 is the parameter of production cleanliness. Different than the previous
section, this assumption describe situations in which the firm can invest in a more efficient
technology that generates less emissions thanks to an increase of ω, rather than filtering it
away at the end of the production process through α.
Under this specification of s, the marginal emissions benefit is:
MEB =
implying that

∂MEB
∂ω

2ωp
2ω 2
−
e,
αω 2 + 2 αω 2 + 2

< 0 when ê < e, with ê =

p(2−αω 2 )
.
4ω

Note that 0 < ê < emax , so that

the effect of an increase of ω, say from ω0 to ω1 , determines a clockwise rotation of the MEB
curve as it is represented in Figure 3.5
The possibility of intersections between the marginal abatement curves representing different integrated technologies has been pointed out by several authors (Amir et al., 2008;
Bauman et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008 and Brechet and Meunier, 2014). The intuition is relatively simple: a technological progress that increases the emission coefficient ω, decreases
the optimal level of unregulated emissions emax =

p
ω

so that the horizontal intercept shifts

to the left in Figure 3. Moreover, when ω increases, an extra abatement of emissions from s
to e becomes more “expensive” since it applies on more units of output, which explains the
greater steepness of the MEB curve.
The intersection of the MEB curves has interesting implications in terms of environmental
regulation, as it implies that pushing the emissions price above a certain critical level can
bring about higher emissions when firms innovate as compared to when they do not (see
for instance Perino and Requate, 2012; Brechet and Meunier, 2014 and Dijkstra and GilMolto, 2018). In Figure 3, this circumstance occurs when the emissions price lies above
the threshold value τ̄ =
5

In Figure 3, ē =
when ω1 → ω0 .

pω0 ω1
ω0 + ω1 ,

p(2−αω0 ω1 )
.
2 ( ω0 + ω1 )

corresponding to the emission level where the two MEB

Note that ē coincides with ê when we consider marginal changes of ω, that is

9
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Figure 3:
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functions cross each other.6
This observation has an interesting corollary in terms of our analysis of the effects of a price
stabilising mechanisms. In our model, the exogenous macroeconomic conditions are proxied by p, with high levels of p corresponding to a growing and wealthy economy, and low
levels of p corresponding to business cycle contractions, with slowdowns in the economic
activities. Since τ̄ is increasing in p, it decreases during a macroeconomic contraction. Therefore, if the regulator commits to avoid that the emission price decreases below a minimum
level τ ∗ , the “likelihood” that innovation increases emissions is greater during recession
periods, in the sense that if τ̄ decreases, the range of parameters for which τ̄ < τ ∗ is larger.
Claim 2 When a PSM prevents emission price to decrease, a macroeconomic downturns can increase
the chances that emissions increase after an investment in integrated abatement technology.
Our stylised model is clearly not able to evaluate formally the probability that τ̄ < τ ∗ . But
the observation above suggest that further research is needed to explore these circumstances.

4 Conclusions
Our paper explores the effects of price stabilising mechanisms in relation to the macroeconomic conditions. We use a stylised model that accommodates different types of abatement technologies and describes firms’ behavior in relation to the evolution of total demand.
6 By

substituting ê back into the MEB function we get τ̂ =

pω
2 .

Note that τ̄ → τ̂ as ω1 → ω0 .
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Our results suggest that automatic price stabilizers could have unintended consequences in
terms of incentives to invest in abatement technologies. Moreover, even when investments
do materialise, the impact on total emissions is ambiguous, particularly during an economic
recessions. This calls for more attention to the pro-cyclical nature of some types of PSMs.
To the best of our knowledge, virtually all institutions that established a carbon market
have also put in place complementary policies to reduce the burden on firms and consumer,
while keeping the right incentives for emission abatement. For instance, the European ETS
system foresees free allocations (mainly for energy intensive industries) and the use of international credits. The European Fund for Strategic Investment also provided guarantees to
boost investment in the field. Moreover, a share of the revenues from the sale of allowances
can be used to co-finance large-scale demonstration projects (e.g. in the EU through the
NER300 programme7 , the Innovation Fund

8

or other member state specific funds), which

can foster the development of cheaper and more effective technologies. Hence, the results
of our paper should not be considered as evidence against the use of a PSM.
The aim of our paper is rather to highlight the importance of analysing and designing
climate policies taking into account the existing macroeconomic policy tools and the overall
industrial policy strategy. Failing in this, can not only unnecessarily aggravate the burden
of emission abatement, but also hamper the achievement of ambitious environmental goals.
In our view, the impact of the business cycle deserves further research, since some countries
may not have the necessary fiscal space to respond with sufficiently strong countercyclical
measures in time of crisis.
We believe that our results have also political economy implications. A procyclical environmental tool can erode the political support for environmental policies, and induce some
governs to backtrack their commitments to international agreements.

7 For
8 For

an overview, see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ner300/index_en.htm
an overview, see https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/innovation-fund_en
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Appendix
In this appendix we derive the results for the more general formulation that incorporates
both the end-of-pipe technology - parametrised through α - and the integrated technology
- parametrised through ω. The representative firm maximise its profits, given by π ( x ) =
px − c( x ) − α1 (s − e)2 , taking into account emission regulation. The production cost is set for
simplicity as c( x ) = 12 x2 + F, F > 0 and s =

1
ω x.

The results discussed in Section 2 simply

require that ω = 1.
Under no regulation, e = s and the firm maximizes π = px − 12 x2 − F, setting xmax = p, so
that emax =

p
ω,

and
πmax =

1 2
p − F.
2

In the case of environmental regulation we have instead:
∂π ( x )
2
1
= p − x − (s − e) = 0,
∂x
α
ω
from which we obtain the optimal production level x (e) = ω

αpω +2e
.
αω 2 +2

Substituting this back

into π ( x ) we can write the optimal profit as a function of the emission level e, that is:
π (e) =

1 p2 αω 2
1 4pω
1 2ω 2 2
+
e
−
e − F,
2 αω 2 + 2 2 αω 2 + 2
2 αω 2 + 2

which is always increasing in p, and increasing in e whenever e < emax =
MEB =

p
ω.

Therefore,

2ωp
∂π (e)
2ω 2
=
−
e
∂e
αω 2 + 2 αω 2 + 2

which is a downward sloping linear function of e with MEB = 0 when e = emax =
By inverting the MEB function we can write the demand of emission as e(τ ) =

p
ω

p
ω.
2

− τ αω2ω+2 2 ,

where τ represents the emissions price.
The partial derivatives of the MEB function show that:
∂MEB
2ω
=
>0
∂p
αω 2 + 2
∂MEB
p − eω
= −2ω 3
<0
2
∂α
(αω 2 + 2)
∂MEB
4p − 2αω 2 p − 8ωe
=
<0
2
∂ω
(αω 2 + 2)
where ê is always smaller than emax =

p
ω

for any level of e;

for e < emax =
for ê =

p
;
ω

p(2 − αω 2 )
< e,
4ω

and it is greater than zero when αω 2 < 2.
12
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The partial derivatives of π (e) are
∂π (e)
ω2
=
( p − eω )2 ,
2
∂α
(αω 2 + 2)
and

∂π
pαω 2
1 4ω
=
+
e,
2
∂p
αω + 2 2 αω 2 + 2

which are both positive, and
2(2e + pαω )( p − eω )
∂π (e)
=
∂ω
(αω 2 + 2)2
which is positive when e ≤ emax =

p
ω.

Further we can show that
ω2
∂2 π ( e )
=2
( p − ωe)
2
∂α∂p
(αω 2 + 2)
and

∂2 π ( e )
ω3
= −2
( p − ωe)
2
∂α∂e
(αω 2 + 2)

which are, respectively, positive and negative as long as e < emax =

p
ω.
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